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ISSUE BRIEF/No. 744
Access to Home Health
Services
In response to tremendous spending growth in Medi-
care home health services, the Balanced Budget Act
(BBA) of 1997 significantly revised the way Medicare
pays for home health services. The law mandated a
prospective payment system (PPS) intended to reduce
costs and give providers incentives to deliver care more
efficiently. Recognizing that time was needed to develop
such a system, the BBA established an interim payment
system (IPS) until the PPS was in place. Since its enact-
ment, the interim system has been a subject of great
controversy, with particular concerns raised about its
impact on beneficiaries’ access to home health care.
The IPS was intended to constrain program outlays by
imposing limits on spending per beneficiary and spending
per visit in the existing cost-based reimbursement system.
With Medicare spending for home health care falling by
14.9 percent between 1997 and 1998,1 the new payment
system appears to have successfully reversed the spending
growth in home health care. On the other hand, since the
IPS was implemented, a number of home health agencies
have closed and reports have suggested that the new
payment limits restrict access to care for patients with
very costly needs. Congressional attention to the effects of
the IPS has increased because it will now be in place
longer than originally intended. In 1998, Congress
delayed by one year the original deadline for PPS imple-
mentation for home health agencies, changing it to
October 1, 2000; some observers predict that date could
be postponed even further.
Last year, Congress responded to concerns about the
IPS by modestly increasing the payment limits for fiscal
year (FY)1999. Pressure continues to intensify from the
home health industry to further increase the limits and
make changes to the way the limits have been calcu-
lated. This Forum session will examine the most recent
studies of the impact of the IPS on access to home
health care, including home health agencies’ responses
to the payment system and its impact on provider
availability. The session will also focus on the extent to
which new payment limits restrict access to care for the
sickest or most expensive populations.
REASONS FOR HOME HEALTH COST
GROWTH
Payments for home health services have been one of
the most rapidly growing parts of the Medicare program
over the past several years. From 1988 to 1996, spend-
ing rose from about $2 billion to $17 billion, an average
annual increase of 31 percent.2 This rise has been
attributed primarily to an increase in the number of
beneficiaries receiving home health services and growth
in the number of visits received, rather than rising
payments per visit. It is one of the most widely used
Medicare services; in 1996, 1 in 10 beneficiaries
received Medicare-covered home health services. Per
user, annual visits increased by nearly 50 percent (from
53 visits to 77) between 1992 and 1996.3
These higher per person utilization levels reflect
longer episodes of care. In 1995, about 20 percent of all
home health episodes lasted 166 days or more; in 1990,
this percentage was 14 percent. Researcher Barbara
Gage has found that although longer episodes account
for higher costs per patient, these longer-term cases
tend to have a greater proportion of less intensive and
less expensive visits.4 She notes that, despite the in-
creasing number of longer-term users, the service mix
or intensity of an episode has not changed over time.
Thus, her research suggests that much of the increase in
home health visits has been due to the growth in longer
episodes that were associated with a relatively large
number of aide services.
Medicare Eligibility and Coverage Rules
Changes in Medicare eligibility and coverage rules
have contributed significantly to the increased use of
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this benefit. The original home health benefit included
at Medicare’s enactment in 1965 was far more restric-
tive than today’s. It was primarily a post-hospitalization
benefit, and it limited the annual number of visits
covered for each beneficiary. Based on congressional
action and a series of court decisions, the eligibility and
coverage standards became much more loosely
defined.5 Coinsurance requirements, prior hospitaliza-
tion requirements, and annual visit limits were abol-
ished. This expansion of coverage culminated in the
landmark class action suit, Duggan v. Bowen, which
essentially allowed payment for chronic conditions and
relaxed limitations on providing multiple visits per day.
As a result, it became easier for beneficiaries to receive
these services.
Under Medicare’s current definition, a beneficiary
must be confined to his or her residence (that is, be
“homebound”) to qualify for home health care. He or she
must also require intermittent skilled nursing, physical
therapy, or speech therapy and be under the care of a
physician. The services must be furnished under a plan of
care prescribed and periodically reviewed by a physician.
Once a beneficiary becomes eligible for the benefit, home
health users can receive any number of visits as long as a
physician certifies the need.
Post-Acute versus Long-Term Care
Several observers have noted the gradual blurring of
the line between Medicare-covered home health ser-
vices and long-term care services over the past several
years. In recent testimony before Congress, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) noted that Medicare’s home
health care has become “available to more beneficiaries,
for less acute conditions, and for longer periods of
time.”6 In 1998, GAO concluded that the home health
benefit has “essentially transformed . . . from one
focused on patients needing short-term care after a
hospitalization to one that serves chronic long-term care
patients as well.”7
Since the early 1990s, researchers have suggested
that Medicare has expanded to cover a void left by other
payers.8 Since personal care is not well covered by
other funding sources, individuals, providers, and other
insurers (including state Medicaid programs) seek out
Medicare assistance to pay for long-term care services.
Most high users of Medicare’s home health benefits
also have long-term care needs. More than nine in ten
high home health users have limitations in activities of
daily living (ADLs), and 79 percent have limitations in
three or more ADLs.9 However, research by Harriet
Komisar and Judith Feder shows that the need for long-
term care does not by itself explain high use of home
health care.10 More than 50 percent of Medicare benefi-
ciaries with long-term care needs who were not in
nursing homes did not use home health care in 1996. In
1994, only 16 percent of home health users with limita-
tions in at least three ADLs were high users of Medi-
care’s home health services. Komisar and Feder stress
that “most high home health users appear to have
multiple, often complex, medical needs requiring a
range of acute as well as long-term care services.”
High-Cost Cases
The highest users of Medicare’s home care services—
the 10 percent who had 200 or more visits during the
year—accounted for 43 percent of the program’s cost in
1994 and 60 percent of the growth in home health spend-
ing between 1991 and 1994.11 These data could reflect
greater coverage of chronic care needs or a greater
provision of discretionary services.
Analysis of the characteristics of expensive home
health cases by Gage found that longer episodes reflect
higher costs per case and that the proportion of aide
visits (relative to nursing and therapy visits) rises
dramatically with costs. According to Gage, these
results show that, on average, the high-cost cases
appear to be the cases receiving substantial numbers of
aide visits, rather than the medically intensive ones.12
Gage points out that it is difficult to distinguish whether
a high number of visits is due to agency inefficiencies
or to treatment of a more chronic, disabled population.
Fraud and Abuse
As Congress debated the BBA, another big factor
contributing to their decision making was widespread
reports of fraud and abuse in the home health industry.
Several analyses by GAO and the Department of Health
and Human Services’ Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) have demonstrated that Medicare has been billed
for home health visits that may not have been needed.
Both GAO and the OIG have warned that lack of
sufficient program controls has produced an environ-
ment that, until recently, has enabled improper billing
and cost-reporting practices to go unchecked.
As home health care costs have gone up, funding for
program safeguard activities has decreased. According
to GAO, “by 1995, fewer than 3.2 percent of all claims
were reviewed to determine whether the beneficiary
actually qualified for the services, needed them, or even
received what was being billed to Medicare.”13 In a
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1997 study, GAO asked the fiscal intermediary to
perform a medical review of 80 high-dollar claims that
had been processed but not reviewed. The Medicare
claims-processing contractor, after examining each
claim and supporting documentation, denied more than
$135,000 in charges, about 43 percent of total charges,
for 46 claims.14
In 1995, Operation Restore Trust, a joint effort by
federal and several state agencies to identify fraud and
abuse in Medicare and Medicaid, was launched. The
campaign targeted home health services, among others,
for investigation. Numerous reports have found very
high rates of noncompliance with Medicare’s coverage
conditions. For example, one OIG audit of Medicare
home health services in California, Illinois, New York,
and Texas found that 40 percent of the total services
contained in 146 of 250 claims (selected randomly from
each of the states) did not meet Medicare reimburse-
ment requirements.15
CHANGES TO HOME HEALTH
PAYMENT POLICY
The BBA made significant changes to Medicare
post-acute payment policies, shifting them from cost-
based reimbursement to prospective payment systems
over the next few years. PPS will apply to all post-acute
providers, including skilled nursing facilities, home
health agencies, and rehabilitation hospitals. A Forum
session scheduled for July 7 will examine in detail the
move to PPS for post-acute providers (see NHPF Issue
Brief No. 743, “Implementing the BBA: The Challenge
of Moving Medicare Post-Acute Services to PPS”).
The one-year delay of implementation of the PPS for
home health agencies was established under the Omni-
bus Consolidated Emergency Supplemental Appropria-
tions Act of 1998. The Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration (HCFA) has stated that the agency is on track to
meet the new October 1, 2000 deadline. HCFA plans to
publish a proposed regulation for the PPS in October
1999 and issue the final rule in July 2000.16 Some
observers have predicted that Y2K compliance issues
and concerns about the Outcome Assessment Informa-
tion Set (OASIS) may cause the deadline to be pushed
back even further.17
The BBA contains a number of other provisions
designed to slow the growth in home health expendi-
tures. Of most concern to the industry is a BBA provi-
sion to further reduce home health cost limits by 15
percent, beginning October 1, 2000 (even if the PPS is
delayed). Other provisions include strengthening
participation requirements for home health agencies and
authorizing the secretary of health and human services
to develop normative guidelines for the frequency and
duration of home health services. The BBA also re-
quires that payments be based on the location where
home health services are provided, not where they are
billed. It clarifies definitions of part-time and intermit-
tent nursing care, limits the definition of skilled nursing
care to exclude venipuncture solely for the purpose of
obtaining a blood sample, and directs the secretary to
study the criteria for determining whether a beneficiary
is homebound (and eligible to receive home health
services under Medicare).18
The Interim Payment System 
The BBA put in place an interim payment system to
govern payments to home health agencies until a
prospective payment system was developed. Since its
implementation, the IPS has generated a great deal of
controversy. In testimony before Congress, Gail Wilen-
sky, chair of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commis-
sion (MedPAC), attributed the controversy, in part, to
“the use of payment policy as a vehicle for curbing the
rapidly rising cost of a benefit that was poorly
defined.”19
Prior to the BBA, agencies were paid the lower of
their actual costs or a limit based on 112 percent of the
average cost per visit of free-standing home health
agencies. The IPS was designed to immediately control
spending by providing incentives to control per-visit
costs and the number and mix of visits for each year.
The new system adds a third criterion to the payment
formula by imposing an annual per-beneficiary limit.
Thus, under the IPS, Medicare pays home health
agencies the lower of their actual costs, the aggregate
per-beneficiary limit, or the aggregate per-visit limit.
Under the BBA, the average per-beneficiary cost
limit is based on 98 percent of the average per-patient
costs for each agency (which had a 12-month cost
report) in FY 1994 (adjusted for inflation for 1996
through 1998) and the average per-patient cost for
agencies in the region. The limit is calculated as a blend
of 75 percent of the agency’s historical costs and 25
percent of the median costs of agencies in the same
region. Agencies without a 12-month cost report ending
in FY 1994 had their limit set at the national median.
The BBA further restricted the per-visit cost limits
by decreasing the limits from 112 percent of the national
mean cost per visit to limits based on 105 percent of the
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national median. The per-visit and per-beneficiary limits
are applied to aggregate agency costs. Thus, agencies
can theoretically balance high-cost visits with low-cost
visits and treat a mix of more intensive and less inten-
sive beneficiaries and still stay below the limits.
1998 Modifications
In October 1998, Congress passed legislation to
moderate the restrictiveness of the IPS. Per-visit limits
were increased to 106 percent of median costs per visit.
The legislation also changed the per-beneficiary limits for
agencies, depending on when the agency was established
and whether the agency’s costs were below the national
median. These provisions were designed to discourage
new agencies from entering the market while recognizing
the historical efficiencies of the older agencies.20
Under these revisions, older agencies (established
before 1994) with costs below the national median will
receive one-third of the difference between their per-
beneficiary limit under the original BBA formula and
the national average. The per-beneficiary limits for
newer agencies established prior to 1998 will be based
on 100 percent of the national rate instead of 98 per-
cent. The average beneficiary limit for agencies estab-
lished in FY 1999 or later will be set at 75 percent of
the national rate, based on 98 percent of the national
median costs.
IMPACT OF THE NEW PAYMENT
POLICIES
The new home health payment policies have gener-
ated a great deal of debate. New cost estimates by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) show that Medi-
care’s home health expenditures were significantly
lower than expected. A number of home health agencies
have closed down, citing the IPS and other billing
requirements as the chief reasons. And, as a result,
concerns about beneficiary access have arisen.
Cost Estimates
CBO originally estimated that the home health
provisions in the BBA would reduce Medicare fee-for-
service spending by $16 billion over the 1998 to 2002
period. In March 1999, CBO revised its baseline
projections of Medicare spending for home health
services to total about $47 billion less than the original
estimated budget projections.
Proponents of the IPS claim that these lower spend-
ing levels show the new system—combined with other
actions—has been successful in achieving its objectives
of controlling both spending per user and spending per
visit. MedPAC’s latest report offers additional explana-
tions for the decrease in reported home health spending,
such as antifraud activities targeting home health care,
more stringent Medicare claims review and sequential
billing policies,21 and market forces affecting the supply
of home health agency employees. Other possible
reasons include increased use of managed care and the
maturation of the home health industry.
CBO attributes a substantial slowing of the growth
of Medicare home health spending to stepped up
antifraud initiatives during 1997 and 1998—which were
not fully anticipated when the original projections were
made. According to CBO, several investigations and
prosecutions were highly publicized during 1997. In
addition, in March 1997, Medicare established a
background check requirement for home health agency
employees, and Operation Restore Trust was expanded
from a five-state demonstration to a nationwide pro-
gram. In September 1997, the secretary of health and
human services imposed a four-month moratorium on
the certification of new home health agencies.
Lower inflation projections and subsequent legisla-
tive changes account for most of the remaining differ-
ences between the initial cost estimates and the revised
estimates, according to CBO. In addition, increases in
the time for processing claims and recoupment of
earlier overpayments have also contributed to the
slowdown in spending.22
In its initial analysis, CBO anticipated that home
health agencies would alter their behavior, increasing
the admission of Medicare home health patients, which
would cut into the expenditure reductions that otherwise
occur through the legislation. Home health agencies
have argued that this behavioral adjustment was
“unwarranted and has led to the enactment of legisla-
tion that devastated home health agencies and the
patients they serve.” Instead of increasing the number
of beneficiaries who use home health services, industry
representatives say, they have been “forced to severely
limit the amount of services they provide in order to
survive under the payment limits.”23
Agency Closures
In fact, a number of home health agencies have not
survived since the IPS became effective. According to
GAO, more than 1,400 Medicare-certified home health
agencies have closed or merged since October 1997.
However, GAO reports that more than 9,000 home
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health agencies still participate in Medicare—a larger
number than in October 1995.
The number of home health agencies has increased
significantly in the past decade—a trend which some
analysts believe contributed to growth in the use of
home health services during this time period. In 1994,
there were almost 8,000 home health agencies, about 40
percent more than in 1989. By 1996, there were more
than 10,000 Medicare-certified agencies.24
GAO’s analysis of agency closures found that half
of the recent voluntary closures nationwide were
concentrated in four states (California, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas)—three of which had experi-
enced agency growth well above the national average.
The agencies that have closed were on average smaller,
as measured by the number of beneficiaries served, than
remaining agencies. In addition, the closed agencies had
provided on average more visits per beneficiary—90.2
compared with 65.2. According to GAO, these findings
suggest that less efficient agencies have had the most
difficulty adjusting to the new payment limits.25
In March 1999, MedPAC surveyed 1,054 Medicare-
eligible home health agencies. About 10 percent of the
agencies in the sample said they no longer provided
home health services, either Medicare or otherwise.
Another 5 percent of the agencies’ phones had been
disconnected, with no new or forwarding numbers
available. Forty percent of the responding agencies
surveyed said that they have closed branches since they
became subject to the IPS.
Agency Practice Patterns
Because the IPS is based on historical cost patterns
and regional and national averages, certain agencies are
under more pressure to lower costs than others. Under
the IPS, agencies with high costs in 1994 will have a
higher cost limit than agencies that had lower costs in
1994. The home health industry has voiced concerns
that reliance on agency-specific and regional costs to
establish the limits rewards inefficient providers and
penalizes efficient providers if changes in their patient
mix or other external factors have significantly in-
creased their costs above the base-year amounts.
According to a study conducted by the Lewin Group
for the National Association for Home Care (NAHC),26
agencies most affected by the per-beneficiary limit
include
 Agencies that have had an increase in severity in
their case mix since 1994.
 Small agencies serving a large number of high-use
patients.
 Rural agencies where alternative sources of care are
less likely to be available.
 Agencies that have added services since 1994 for
which the costs will not be included in the per-
beneficiary limit calculation.
 New providers and agencies resulting from mergers
and acquisitions.
For those agencies with base-year costs higher than
other agencies in their region, the annual average per-
beneficiary limit will be below base-year costs. This
limit is designed to encourage inefficient, high-cost
agencies to reduce costs. In a 1998 letter report, GAO
acknowledges that certain other factors may produce
cost variation across agencies that are beyond the
agencies’ control. Examples include the influence of
state Medicaid policies, type of population served
(urban versus rural), and the number of other providers
available in a market.
In addition, those agencies that experienced a higher
growth in visits per beneficiary than the average since
the base year are under more pressure to reduce costs.
According to HCFA data, between 1994 and 1997 the
number of visits per beneficiary rose, on average, by 4.5
percent. However, many agencies greatly exceeded that
average. In 10 states, the average number of visits
increased by more than 10 percent. GAO’s analysis
found that in some states (such as Louisiana, Oklahoma,
and Texas), this high growth boosted utilization that
already greatly exceeded the national average.27 But in
other states with high increases in number of visits—
Delaware, Kansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, South
Dakota, and Virginia—utilization levels were still
below the national average. Nevertheless, the average
annual per-beneficiary limits will constrain payments to
these agencies as well as to those above the national
average.
An analysis of Medicare claims data by MedPAC
found that home health agencies have changed their
practice patterns since the implementation of the IPS.
Fewer beneficiaries received home health care in the
first three months of calendar year 1998 than in the
same quarter of 1997. MedPAC also found a substantial
decrease in the number of visits per users.28
Other factors may be contributing to this decrease in
home health utilization. One contentious issue has been
that the payment limits have been applied retroactively.
According to HCFA, this is in large measure a result of
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the statute that required implementation before limits
could be calculated and published by HCFA. Due largely
to the inability of fiscal intermediaries to provide accurate
and timely coverage information, many agencies did not
find out their individual limits until they were well into
their FY 1998 cost reporting periods. Agencies, in the
meantime, had to estimate their expected payments and
adjust their practice patterns accordingly. The home
health industry maintains that these retroactive payments
have led to service reductions and closings.
Another factor suggested by some analysts has been
the increased scrutiny of home health claims and
agency billing practices. These antifraud initiatives may
have led to more attention to coverage requirements
and, hence, less utilization of the benefit. MedPAC
found that confusion and anxiety on the part of home
health providers may have inadvertently resulted in
restricted services. In particular, MedPAC found that
home health agency representatives “did not always
know their per-beneficiary limits or understand these
limits apply to average costs for all patients served.”29
As a result, some agencies may have misinterpreted the
limits as absolute caps on the amount they could spend
on each beneficiary, which may have led them to reduce
services unnecessarily. Finally, HCFA has raised
concerns about the accuracy of the claims data due to
problems in the way the shift of some home health
services to Part B was administered,30 which could have
resulted in underreported use.
Beneficiary Access 
The key concern for policymakers is whether these
changes in the home health payment policy have
restricted access for beneficiaries who are entitled to
receive care at home. Home health agencies and benefi-
ciary advocates claim that access has been compro-
mised because of the interim payment system. A survey
of 1,300 state doctors commissioned by the Massachu-
setts Medical Society found that two-thirds said home
health care is “insufficient at least some of the time,
with chronically ill and elderly patients hurt the most.”
Nearly half of the physician respondents reported that
they extend hospital stays for fear of insufficient home
care.31 According to NAHC, patients who need the
most care are at most risk for cutbacks or being denied
access to care. NAHC maintains that, because of lower
Medicare payments, “providers are cutting back on
staff, leaving agencies unable to care for all who need
home care.”32
Beneficiary advocates have raised concerns about
situations in which home health agencies have denied
access to care because they believe Medicare will no
longer cover the service. In these instances where no
service has been delivered, beneficiaries cannot appeal
to Medicare because no claim for reimbursement has
been denied.33 Beneficiary advocates have called for an
improved appeals process as it applies to denials,
terminations, and reductions of Medicare home health
services.
So far, GAO and HCFA have maintained that there
is no evidence that access to home health care is a
serious problem for most Medicare beneficiaries.
GAO’s interviews with hospital discharge planners and
local aging organization representatives in seven states
with high numbers of closures has not indicated a
change over the past year in the willingness or ability of
home health agencies to serve Medicare beneficiaries in
their areas. However, respondents to GAO’s study did
report that patients with intensive skilled nursing needs
and those needing a significant number of visits over a
long period of time (rather than patients with short-term
rehabilitation needs) were the most difficult to place in
home health services.34 GAO said it could not deter-
mine whether this reflected greater difficulty than in
previous years.
MedPAC’s recent survey of home health agencies
found that they have adopted new admission and dis-
charge practices since the IPS was implemented. Agen-
cies reported that they are avoiding high-cost or seem-
ingly high-cost patients. Nearly 40 percent of agencies
reported that they no longer admit all Medicare patients
whom they would have admitted previously. In particular,
agencies most frequently identified long-term or chronic
care patients as those they no longer admitted or have
discharged as a result of the IPS.35
THE FORUM SESSION
This Forum session will examine issues related to
Medicare’s coverage of home health care services and
the initial effects the IPS is having on provider avail-
ability and beneficiary access. Policy options currently
under consideration will also be explored. The discus-
sion will center on the following questions:
 Has beneficiary access to home care services been
compromised as a result of the interim payment
system?
 Are beneficiaries who have experienced access
problems truly entitled to Medicare covered home
health benefits or do they instead require long-term
care services (which are not covered by Medicare)?
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 What is known about the agencies that have recently
closed? Were they truly viable in an economic
sense? Did they provide the highest levels of care?
What could be done to improve the oversight and
quality of the actual care provided?
 Has the IPS effectively weeded out some of the
inefficiencies in the home health industry? Can
efficient agencies remain viable under the IPS?
What if their populations grow sicker?
 If developing the PPS takes longer than is assumed,
should the interim limits be loosened or adapted?
For example, should different standards be applied
to patients with chronic care needs than to those
with acute care needs? Should there be outlier or
case mix adjustments for agencies with sicker-than-
average patients?
 Should Medicare appeals processes be strengthened
to require home health agencies to give beneficiaries
a standard notice that explains what services are
being denied, reduced, or terminated?
 Will implementation of the PPS correct most of
these payment and access problems? Or will demo-
graphic trends and preference for home and
community-based care put more pressure on Medi-
care to expand its home health benefits?
 How do Medicare reimbursement policies affect the
continuum of care? Should the focus move to
coordination of care rather than site of care?
Speakers
Murray Ross, Ph.D., executive director of the
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, will present
an overview of Medicare’s new payment policies for
home health services and factors that might affect
access to care, including the number of providers and
home health agencies’ response to the interim payment
system. Dr. Ross will also share the commission’s
recommendations to Congress and the secretary of
health and human services to ameliorate concerns
raised. Before joining MedPAC in 1998, Dr. Ross was
chief of the Health Cost Estimates Unit in the Budget
Analysis Division of CBO. He moved to that division
in 1995, after spending six years in the Health and
Human Resources Division, where he worked on a
variety of issues relating to health care reform and
income security.
Laura Dummit, associate director of health financ-
ing and public health for the General Accounting
Office, will discuss GAO’s ongoing work to assess
access to home health care. She will focus on recent
closures of home health agencies and the extent to
which these closures may have affected access to care.
At GAO, Ms. Dummit is responsible for overseeing the
body of work related to Medicare payment policies and
health care delivery, including post-acute-care payment
methods. Prior to joining GAO in 1998, Ms. Dummit
was the deputy director of MedPAC (formerly the
Prospective Payment Assessment Commission).
Barbara Gage, Ph.D., senior research associate for
the Urban Institute, will discuss her work examining the
extent to which new payment limits restrict access to
care for the sickest, most costly populations. She will
present an analysis of the characteristics of the expen-
sive home health cases, regional variation in cost per
case, and state level variation in home health cost and
use. Dr. Gage will also discuss the likely effects on
individual states of moving from a blended payment
that combines agency-specific costs with regional costs
to state or regional average payment limits. Previously,
Dr. Gage was a senior analyst at the Prospective Pay-
ment Assessment Commission. She has recently joined
Mathematica Policy Research as a senior researcher.
These presentations will be followed by a response
panel of experts representing the perspectives of
government, the home health industry, and Medicare
beneficiaries. Invited respondents include Robert C.
Wardwell, director of the Division of Community Post-
Acute Care in HCFA’s Center for Health Plans and
Providers. Mr. Wardwell is responsible for Medicare
reimbursement and basic benefit policy for home
health, durable medical equipment, and hospice. His
unit’s principal responsibilities include the home health
interim payment system and home health prospective
payment. Before assuming his current position in 1997,
Mr. Wardwell held a wide variety of policy and opera-
tional positions in both Medicare and Medicaid compo-
nents of HCFA for over 25 years.
Nancy King, vice president of Home and Commu-
nity Based Services for the Ohio Presbyterian Retire-
ment System (OPRS), has nearly 20 years of experience
in the home and community-based services field. In her
current position, Ms. King is responsible for OPRS’s
statewide home and community-based services opera-
tion, which includes seven home health agencies, 10
adult day care services sites, two home-delivered meal
programs, a chore service, a senior center, and miscella-
neous caregiver support and education sites.
Peter Cobb is the executive director of the Ver-
mont Assembly of Home Health Agencies, the profes-
sional association of the home health and visiting
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